If that strategy requires little or no effort on our part, so much the better. In contrast to the scoring system utilized in diving competitions, you are awarded no points in business endeavors for “degree of difficulty.” Furthermore, as Ronald Reagan cautioned: “It’s said that hard work never killed anyone, but I say why take the chance?”

如果我们不需要或只需很少的努力,那就更好了。与潜水比赛中使用的计分系统相比,您在艰苦程度方面的商业努力不会获得任何分数。此外,正如罗纳德·里根(Ronald Reagan)告诫的那样:据说辛勤工作从未杀死任何人,但我说为什么要抓住机会?

The Family Jewels and How We Increase Your Share of These Gems


On page A-1 we list Berkshire’s subsidiaries, a smorgasbord of businesses employing 360,000 at yearend. You can read much more about these controlled operations in the 10-K that fills the back part of this report. Our major positions in companies that we partly own and don’t control are listed on page 7 of this letter. That portfolio of businesses, too, is large and diverse.


Most of Berkshire’s value, however, resides in four businesses, three controlled and one in which we have only a 5.4% interest. All four are jewels.


The largest in value is our property/casualty insurance operation, which for 53 years has been the core of Berkshire. Our family of insurers is unique in the insurance field. So, too, is its manager, Ajit Jain, who joined Berkshire in 1986.

价值最大的是我们的财产/财产保险业务,该业务在53年以来一直是伯克希尔的核心业务。我们的保险公司家族在保险领域是独一无二的。它的经理Ajit Jain也是如此,他于1986年加入伯克希尔。

Overall, the insurance fleet operates with far more capital than is deployed by any of its competitors worldwide. That financial strength, coupled with the huge flow of cash Berkshire annually receives from its non-insurance businesses, allows our insurance companies to safely follow an equity-heavy investment strategy not feasible for the overwhelming majority of insurers. Those competitors, for both regulatory and credit-rating reasons, must focus on bonds.


And bonds are not the place to be these days. Can you believe that the income recently available from a 10-year U.S. Treasury bond – the yield was 0.93% at yearend – had fallen 94% from the 15.8% yield available in September 1981? In certain large and important countries, such as Germany and Japan, investors earn a negative return on trillions of dollars of sovereign debt. Fixed-income investors worldwide – whether pension funds, insurance companies or retirees – face a bleak future.


Some insurers, as well as other bond investors, may try to juice the pathetic returns now available by shifting their purchases to obligations backed by shaky borrowers. Risky loans, however, are not the answer to inadequate interest rates. Three decades ago, the once-mighty savings and loan industry destroyed itself, partly by ignoring that maxim.


Berkshire now enjoys $138 billion of insurance “float” – funds that do not belong to us, but are nevertheless ours to deploy, whether in bonds, stocks or cash equivalents such as U.S. Treasury bills. Float has some similarities to bank deposits: cash flows in and out daily to insurers, with the total they hold changing very little. The massive sum held by Berkshire is likely to remain near its present level for many years and, on a cumulative basis, has been costless to us. That happy result, of course, could change – but, over time, I like our odds.


I have repetitiously – some might say endlessly – explained our insurance operation in my annual letters to you. Therefore, I will this year ask new shareholders who wish to learn more about our insurance business and “float” to read the pertinent section of the 2019 report, reprinted on page A-2. It’s important that you understand the risks, as well as the opportunities, existing in our insurance activities.


Our second and third most valuable assets – it’s pretty much a toss-up at this point – are Berkshire’s 100% ownership of BNSF, America’s largest railroad measured by freight volume, and our 5.4% ownership of Apple. And in the fourth spot is our 91% ownership of Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”). What we have here is a very unusual utility business, whose annual earnings have grown from $122 million to $3.4 billion during our 21 years of ownership.

我们第二,第三高价值的资产(目前几乎是一笔交易)是伯克希尔拥有BNSF100%所有权,这是按货运量衡量的美国最大铁路,以及我们拥有5.4%的苹果。排在第四位的是伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源(“ BHE”)的91%所有权。我们拥有的是一家非常不寻常的公用事业公司,在我们拥有的21年中,其年收入从1.22亿美元增长至34亿美元。

I’ll have more to say about BNSF and BHE later in this letter. For now, however, I would like to focus on a practice Berkshire will periodically use to enhance your interest in both its “Big Four” as well as the many other assets Berkshire owns.


* * * * * * * * * * * *

Last year we demonstrated our enthusiasm for Berkshire’s spread of properties by repurchasing the equivalent of 80,998 “A” shares, spending $24.7 billion in the process. That action increased your ownership in all of Berkshire’s businesses by 5.2% without requiring you to so much as touch your wallet.

去年,我们回购了80,998“ A”股,并花费247亿美元,显示了我们对伯克希尔·哈撒韦遍及房地产的热情。这一举动使您在伯克希尔所有业务中的所有权增加了5.2%,而无需您花太多钱就能摸到钱包。

Following criteria Charlie and I have long recommended, we made those purchases because we believed they would both enhance the intrinsic value per share for continuing shareholders and would leave Berkshire with more than ample funds for any opportunities or problems it might encounter.


In no way do we think that Berkshire shares should be repurchased at simply any price. I emphasize that point because American CEOs have an embarrassing record of devoting more company funds to repurchases when prices have risen than when they have tanked. Our approach is exactly the reverse.


Berkshire’s investment in Apple vividly illustrates the power of repurchases. We began buying Apple stock late in 2016 and by early July 2018, owned slightly more than one billion Apple shares (split-adjusted). Saying that, I’m referencing the investment held in Berkshire’s general account and am excluding a very small and separately-managed holding of Apple shares that was subsequently sold. When we finished our purchases in mid-2018, Berkshire’s general account owned 5.2% of Apple.


Our cost for that stake was $36 billion. Since then, we have both enjoyed regular dividends, averaging about $775 million annually, and have also – in 2020 – pocketed an additional $11 billion by selling a small portion of our position.


Despite that sale – voila! – Berkshire now owns 5.4% of Apple. That increase was costless to us, coming about because Apple has continuously repurchased its shares, thereby substantially shrinking the number it now has outstanding.

尽管有特价瞧! 伯克希尔现在拥有苹果5.4%的股份。涨价对我们来说是无价的,这是因为苹果不断回购股票,从而大大减少了现在流通在外的股票数量。

But that’s far from all of the good news. Because we also repurchased Berkshire shares during the 21¤2 years,


you now indirectly own a full 10% more of Apple’s assets and future earnings than you did in July 2018.


This agreeable dynamic continues. Berkshire has repurchased more shares since yearend and is likely to further reduce its share count in the future. Apple has publicly stated an intention to repurchase its shares as well. As these reductions occur, Berkshire shareholders will not only own a greater interest in our insurance group and in BNSF and BHE, but will also find their indirect ownership of Apple increasing as well.


The math of repurchases grinds away slowly, but can be powerful over time. The process offers a simple way for investors to own an ever-expanding portion of exceptional businesses.


And as a sultry Mae West assured us: “Too much of a good thing can be . . . wonderful.”

·韦斯特(Mae West)闷闷不乐地向我们保证:好事太多 。精彩的。





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